In this paper we investigate how the competitiveness of Cournot markets varies with the number of …rms in an industry. We review previous Cournot experiments in the literature. Additionally, we conduct a new series of experiments studying oligopolies with two, three, four, and …ve …rms in a uni…ed frame. With two …rms we …nd some collusion. Three-…rm oligopolies tend to produce outputs at the Nash level. Markets with four or …ve …rms are never collusive and typically settle at or above the Cournot outcome. Some of those markets are actually quite competitive with outputs close to the Walrasian outcome.
Introduction
In a classical paper, Selten (1973) argues that "four are few and six are many", referring to the number of …rms that separates a small group of …rms from a large one. This distinction between small and large groups expresses the general belief (see, e.g., Chamberlain, 1933 ) that cooperative behavior should be expected in small groups, while large groups are characterized by the prevalence of non-cooperative (Nash equilibrium) behavior. 1 While Selten's prediction depends on speci…c institutional assumptions regarding commitment possibilities in a quota cartel, we want to test the general notion that a "large" group need not be very large indeed.
We focus on standard homogenous Cournot oligopolies (as did Selten, 1973) . Cournot oligopoly is certainly among the most frequently employed models in the theory of industrial organization and other applied …elds. Moreover, the Cournot model plays an important role in antitrust policy. It is therefore of interest how the predictive value of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium depends on the number of …rms in the market.
We review the scattered evidence of previous Cournot experiments that we could …nd in the literature and present a meta-analysis. A problem with this approach is, however, that the reviewed experiments di¤er with respect to numerous design features. Therefore, we supplement the meta-analysis by a new set of experiments that for the …rst time compares experimental Cournot oligopolies in a uni…ed frame for two, three, four, and …ve …rms. For both, the meta-analysis and our own data, we introduce a measure that relates actual total output to total output in equilibrium and …nd that it is increasing in the number of …rms. More speci…cally, we conclude that "many" may be even less than Selten suggested, namely about four …rms.
There are several papers pertaining to market structure and the competitiveness of outcomes in posted-o¤er markets (see Holt, 1995 , for a survey). In posted-o¤er experiments, a key question is for which number of …rms the market price tends to be above marginal cost. For example, Isaac 1 and Reynolds (1989) analyze posted-o¤er markets with two and with four …rms and conclude that four …rms may be su¢cient for competitive performance. In the Cournot model, the price-cost margin depends directly on the number of …rms. 2 It is presumably this feature of the Cournot model which explain its prominence in strictly structure-based merger policy. We therefore think that a systematic analysis of number e¤ects in experimental Cournot oligopoly is of substantial interest. 3 A disclaimer seems warranted right at the beginning. We do not claim that there exists a unique number of …rms which determines a de…nite borderline between non-cooperative and collusive 4 markets irrespective of all institutional and structural details of markets. In fact, extensive experimental research has explored the impact of such institutional and structural factors (e.g., announcements or information provision) on market outcomes (see, e.g., Holt, 1995) . Nevertheless, the evidence from the various di¤erent experiments we survey suggests that collusive tendencies can rarely be found in markets with more than two …rms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys previous Cournot experiments. Section 3 introduces our own experimental design and Section 4 presents our data. We brie ‡y conclude in Section 5.
Previous experimental studies
For this survey we have selected suitable treatments from all experiments we are aware of that study standard Cournot oligopolies with quantity setting …rms and homogeneous products. 5 While the experiments vary in their design with respect to numerous dimensions, we try to select treatments from each experiment that are somewhat comparable. 6 In particular, we select treatments without communication and without discounting. Further, we require that subjects are matched with the same opponents for the entire course of the experiment and receive only aggregate information about the behavior of other …rms. 7 With one exception, we selected experiments with symmetric …rms. 8 There are a number of remaining di¤erences in designs, e.g., the number of periods, random end versus …xed end, the action space, the functional form of the cost and the demand functions, etc. Despite such remaining di¤erences in designs, we compare the results of all those studies with respect to one single number, the ratio of average total quantity in the market to the total quantity predicted by the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, r := ¹ Q=Q N . 9 Table 1 lists all experimental studies we are aware of.
We are particularly interested in how r varies with the number of …rms in a market. Despite all dissimilarities between the experiments, a trend emerges: r is increasing with the number of …rms. While the average ratio for duopolies is 0.936 it becomes 1.0275 for three …rms, 1.029 for four …rms and 1.050 for …ve …rms. Pearson's correlation coe¢cient between r and n, the number of …rms, is 0.48 and is signi…cant at the 5% level.
Summary 1. Previous studies indicate that collusion sometimes occurs in
duopolies and is very rare in markets with more than two …rms. On average, total outputs in markets with more than two …rms slightly exceed the Cournot prediction. There is a weak trend suggesting that this e¤ect may become stronger as the number of …rms increases.
In the next section we introduce a new experiment that allows to test for number e¤ects in oligopoly in a uni…ed frame.
Experimental design and theoretical predictions
In a series of computerized 10 experiments, we studied linear symmetric n…rm Cournot oligopoly markets. We decided to design the experiment such that it is best compatible with the studies reviewed in Section 2. This implies that (i) …rms are symmetric, (ii) there should be no means of communication and cheap talk, (iii) subjects are informed about the demand and cost parameters of the market and about the aggregate quantities of their opponents from the previous round.
Basis for all markets were the following demand and cost functions. The demand side of the market was modeled with the computer buying all supplied units according to the inverse demand function p = maxf100 ¡ Q; 0g
with Q = P n i=1 q i denoting total quantity. The cost function for each seller was simply
that is, constant marginal cost was equal to one.
It is straightforward to derive the Nash equilibrium for this market. The individual equilibrium output is q n i = 99 n + 1 and the equilibrium pro…t is ¼ n i = (q n i ) 2 : The respective total quantities Q n are shown in Table 2 . Alternative benchmark outcomes are the symmetric collusive output, which is q c i = 99=(2n) for an individual …rm and Q c = 49:5 in total, and the competitive (or rivalistic) outcome where price equals marginal cost at q r i = 99=n and Q r = 99, respectively: Subjects could choose quantities from a …nite grid between 0 and 100 with .01 as the smallest step. The number of periods was 25 in all markets and this was commonly known.
Subjects had information about demand and cost conditions to calculate best replies to the quantities of the other …rms. This information was provided verbally and in the form of a 'pro…t calculator'. When fed with data regarding the other …rms (total quantities of the other …rms), the calculator allowed to try out the consequences of own actions. After each period, subjects were informed about their own quantity and pro…t and the aggregate quantity their competitors produced. 11 For each number of …rms, we conducted six markets. The six duopolies were run in one session. For the three and four …rm markets, we had two sessions, and for the …ve …rm oligopolies, there were three sessions. 12 Subjects were randomly allocated to computer terminals in the lab such that they could not infer with whom they would interact. The 84 subjects for this experiment were recruited via telephone and email. No subject participated in more than one session nor had any subject previous experience with market experiments. Subjects were paid according to their total pro…t earned in the 25 periods. We varied the exchange rates such that, depending on the number of …rms, subjects would have made identical earning at Nash equilibrium play. The average payo¤ was about DM 22. Sessions lasted about 45-60 minutes including instruction time.
Instructions (see Appendix) were written on paper and distributed in the beginning of each session. After the instructions were read, we explained the di¤erent windows of the computer screen. When subjects were familiar 1 1 Note that a pro…t calculator essentially gives the same information as the pro…t tables normally used in Cournot experiments. With a pro…t table, a rather coarse discrete action space is required which often leads to multiple Nash equilibria (Holt, 1985) . With a pro…t calculator, a continuous action space can be approximated such that additional Nash equilibria are arbitrary close to the prediction. 1 2 Some of these sessions served as control treatments in an experiment on mergers (Huck, Konrad, Müller, and Normann, 2000). with both, the rules and the handling of the computer program, we started the …rst round. Table 2 and Figure 1 compare total quantities as implied by the theoretical Nash equilibrium prediction with total quantities in the experiment, averaged over all rounds and the …nal eight rounds, respectively. 13 In all cases average total quantity increases with the number of …rms. The di¤erences are all signi…cant at the 1% level according to a MWU-test for rounds 17-25. For rounds 1-25, the di¤erences between three and two …rms are positive and signi…cant at the 1% level and between …ve and four …rms at the 5% level. The di¤erence between 4 and 3 …rms is positive but not signi…cant. 14 The ratio of actual to predicted total quantities, r, is also increasing with the number of …rms. Most di¤erences are not signi…cant when n is increased by 1. However, the crucial di¤erence in r between two and four …rms (to which our title alludes) is signi…cant at a 2% level of signi…cance for r 17¡25 and at a 5% level for r 1¡25 (one-sided MWU tests). Furthermore, Pearson's correlation coe¢cient between r 1¡25 and n is 0.53 (signi…cant at 1% level). Between r 17¡25 and n it is 0.61 (also signi…cant at 1% level).
Results
As in Fouraker and Siegel (1963) we want to classify each individual session according to the degree of competitiveness. Our measure for this is aggregate output. We check to which of the three predictions, (C)ollusive, (N)ash, or (R)ivalistic 15 , the aggregate output is closest to and classify the outcomes accordingly. With …ve …rms, two sessions qualify as Rivalistic and three as Nash. Also with four …rms, we …nd that all sessions qualify either as Nash or as Rivalistic. With two …rms, two out of six sessions are Collusive and the remaining are classi…ed as Nash. Thus, there is clear evidence that there is a qualitative di¤erence between two and four or more …rms. Only with three …rms, all sessions classify as Nash. Summary 2. In our experiments with a uni…ed frame, we …nd that, with two …rms, some collusion occurs. The evidence on three-…rm is such that Nash equilibrium is a good predictor. Markets with four or more …rms are never collusive and typically settle around the Cournot outcome while some of them are very competitive with outputs close to the Walrasian outcome. Overall, the ratio of actual and predicted total output is signi…cantly increasing with the number of …rms.
Conclusion
Number e¤ects seem to play an important role in oligopolies. The review of the existing literature on Cournot experiments and our own new experiment suggest the following. While …rms in duopolies sometimes manage to collude, this seems to be di¢cult to achieve in markets with more …rms. In fact, total average output often exceeds the Nash prediction in those markets. Furthermore, the data suggest that these deviations are increasing in the number of …rms. Both e¤ects may be of relevance when evaluating the potential e¤ects of proposed mergers.
